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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Freedom of the Press-Validity of Municipal Ordinance Regu-
lating Distribution of Printed Matter-[Federal].-A person distributing religious
tracts was convicted for violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the distribution of
"circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind" without the permit of
the city manager. On appeal from the Georgia Court of Appeals' to the United States
Supreme Court, held, this ordinance was unconstitutional on its face, in that it impairs
freedom of the press in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Lovell v. City of Griffin.2
In cases involving ordinances of this kind the problem is to reach a compromise be-
tween the exercise of individual rights and liberties on the one hand and the use of the
police power of the state on the other. The individual rights here concerned constitute
a particular phase of the constitutional rights of free speech and press, while the state
desires to maintain order in streets and other public places.
The common municipal ordinances regulating distribution of handbills and other
printed matter may be classified as follows: (i) those prohibiting any distribution of
any type of literature; (2) those affecting the manner of circulating; (3) those affecting
the distribution of certain kinds of publications.
Ordinances of the first type have been upheld by some state courts as within the
valid police power of the municipalities enacting them for the protection of public
health and safety;3 but other courts have objected to them as being an unreasonable
deprivation of liberty not warranted by the ends they seek to promote. 4 In some cases
the broad language of the regulation has been limited by interpretation to fall within
the second or third class.s It is the sweeping prohibitive character of this type of
ordinance that the court attacks in the principal case: "Whatever the motive which
induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the
freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship."16
The opinion in the instant case implies that ordinances of the second or third type
would be upheld if restricted in their application with respect to time and place or if
I Lovell v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga.App. 6og, 19i S.E. 152 (1937).
2 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938).
3 In re Anderson, 69 Neb. 686, 689, 96 N.W. 149, r50 (1903) ("A police regulation ob-
viously intended as such, and not operating unreasonably beyond the occasion of its enact-
ment, is not invalid simply because it may affect incidentally the exercise of some right
guaranteed by the Constitution."); Milwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383, 234 N.W. 352 (193X)
("It is the form of the matter distributed rather than its printed contents that is to govern.");
Dziatkiewicz v. Maplewood, 115 N.J.L. 37, 178 Atl. 205 (1935).
4 People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275 (i889); City of Chicago v. Schultz, 341
fI1. 208, 173 N.E. 276 (1930).
s Coughlin v. Sullivan, ioo N.J.L. 42, 126 AtI. 177 (1924) (ordinance held to apply only to
advertising, not to pamphlets containing matter of public interest, in this case criticism of the
city administration); People v. Johnson, "17 Misc. 133, Igr N.Y.Supp. 750 (1921).
6 P. 669.
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they were limited to prohibition of means of circulation which may be regarded as
inconsistent with the maintenance of public order, or contained other restrictions of
this kind.7 The question of permissible restrictions has sometimes been raised by
other courts when interpreting ordinances of the second or third type. In a recent
New York decision an ordinance was held reasonable which required a license of
everyone engaged in "the business of bill posting and distributing." It was held that
under such an ordinance only the business of bill posting could be licensed, while
sporadic acts of distributing circulars would not fall under its provisions.8 Other de-
cisions have upheld ordinances which prohibited throwing of printed matter on
porches, into yards, alleys, or sticking them on automobiles since such a way of dis-
tribution was likely to litter streets. 9
Within the third type those ordinances are most frequent which prohibit the dis-
tribution of advertising matter only,=O sometimes expressly excepting newspapers and
publications printing news of general nature." The value of such a distinction is open
to doubt. What is news of general nature as compared with advertising matter? Is
the announcement of a political meeting matter of general nature? A New Jersey
court held it was advertising matter only.12 In a recent Massachusetts decision pam-
phlets advocating a labor union were held advertising matter. 3 On the other hand, a
Michigan court held that an ordinance was not reasonable if it included in its prohi-
bition the circulating of "an invitation to a moral and Christian assembly of people
gathered together for the public good." X4
The instant case holding that handbills merit the same protection as newspapers is
of practical importance to minority groups which might otherwise be materially
hampered in advocating their doctrines.' s The language of many municipal ordinances
7 "The ordinance is not limited to 'literature' that is obscene or offensive to public morals
or that advocates unlawful conduct ..... The ordinance is comprehensive with regard to the
method of distribution ..... There is thus no restriction in its application with respect to
time or place. It is not limited to ways which might be regarded as inconsistent with the
maintenance of public order, or as involving disorderly conduct, the molestation of the in-
habitants or the misuse or littering of the streets." P. 668.
8 City of Rochester v. Parr, i N.Y.Supp.(2d) 771 (City Ct. 1937).
9 Philadelphia v. Brabender, 201 Pa. 574, 5I Ati. 374 (1902); Sieroty v. City of Huntington
Pk., 211 Cal.App. 377, 295 Pac. 564 ('93'); San Francisco Shopping News Co. v. South San
Francisco, 69 F.(2d) 879 (C.C.A. 9th i934); Goldblatt Bros. v. East Chicago, 6 N.E.(2d) 331
(Ind. 1937); Allen v. McGovern, 12 N.J.Misc. 12, i69 AtI. 345 (1933).
1oWettengel v. Denver, 20 Coo. 552, 39 Pac. 343 (i895); Almassi v. City of Newark,
8 N.J.Misc. 420, i5o Atl. 217 (1930); Commonwealth v. Kimball, i3 N.E.(2d) i8 (Mass.
1938).
" People v. St. John, io8 Cal.App. 279, 288 Pac. 53 (1930); Sieroty v. City of Huntington
Pk., 211 Cal.App. 377, 295 Pac. 564 (I93i).
"2 Almassi v. City of Newark, 8 N.J.Misc. 420, 15o Ati. 217 (1930) (handbills announcing
mass meeting of the Communist party).
13 Commonwealth v. Kimball, 13 N.E.(2d) i8 (Mass. 1938).
'4 People v. Armstrong, 73 Mlich. 288, 41 N.W. 275 (i889).
SFor comment see Time, p. i6 (April II, x938); Nation, p. 398 (April 9, 1938); New
York Times, p. i (March 29, 1938).
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will no doubt need revision in the light of this opinion. 6 Interpretations such as those
mentioned above 7 by the Massachusetts and New Jersey courts including labor and
political propaganda as advertising would seem contrary to the spirit of this opinion,
as well as to the general principle indicated by a line of recent Supreme Court de-
cisions stressing the importance of protection of civil rights and liberties.'8
Constitutional Law-Jurisdiction over Land Owned by the United States-P.W.A.
Housing-[Federal].-A contractor, erecting, under contract with the United States,
a low-cost housing and slum-clearance project on land acquired by the United States
for such purposes, was criminally prosecuted for failure to comply with municipal
ordinances in relation to building permits and building inspections. Held, the con-
tractor was not amenable to such ordinances, despite the Act of Congress of June 29,
1936, which provided that the the acquisition of land for housing projects "shall not
be held to deprive any state or political subdivision thereof of its civil and criminal
jurisdiction in and over such property, or2 to impair the civil rights under the local
law of the tenants or inhabitants on such property; and insofar as any such jurisdic-
tion has been taken away from any such state or subdivision, or any such rights have
been impaired, jurisdiction over any such property is hereby ceded back to such state
or subdivision." City of Oklahoma City v. Sanders.3
The analysis of federal jurisdiction over land owned by the United States is con-
tingent upon the type of ownership and the manner of acquisition of such land. The
federal government may own land in much the same manner as a private owner, or
as a sovereign for purposes connected with its governmental functions.4
If the ownership is merely of a proprietary nature the state has general govern-
mental control over the property,s although it may not exercise eminent domain over6
or tax such lands.7 Moreover, the United States may pass legislation protecting its
16 A recent decision upholding a Milwaukee ordinance has been attacked on the basis of
the principal case. An appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court is now pending. Chicago
Tribune, May 3, 1938, P. 7.
'7 See notes 12 and 13 supra.
18 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (i935);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (z936); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(r936); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (x937); Hemdon v. Lowry, 3o U.S. 242 (1937).
' 49 Stat. 2026 (1936), 40 U.S.C.A. §421 (Supp. 1937).
*Italics added.
3 394 F. (2d) 323 (C.C.A. ioth 1938).
4Willis, Constitutional Law 258-259 (1936); 1 Willoughby, On the Constitution §251
(2d ed. 1929); 2 Story, On the Constitution c. XXIII (sth ed. x89r); 24 Calif. L. Rev. 573
(1936).
s 24 Calif. L. Rev. 573 (1936).
6 Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1916).
Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 1s (1885); see also Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook,
281 U.S. 647 (r929); nor may a state tax any of the products which the federal government
may have given a license to extract from such land, Willis, Constitutional Law 258 (1936)
and cases therein cited.
